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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examine the consequences of imperfect information on the pattern of  
transfers from parents to children. Drawing on the theory of mechanism design, we consider a 
model of family contract with two levels of effort. We prove that equal transfers among 
children are expected under perfect information, while the second-best contract implies risk-
sharing between the two generations, so that poor families experience higher agency costs.. 
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 1 Introduction 
 During the last two decades, economists have paid increasing attention to the motives behind 
intergenerational transfers within the family. Following the seminal contributions of Becker 
(1974, 1991), Bernheim et alii (1985), and Cox (1987, 1990), the two main models deal with 
altruism and exchange. In the first case, parents care about the well-being of their children and 
they redistribute money in order to equalize the different standards of living. In the second 
case, parents provide money in exchange of upstream transfers which take the form of non-
market services and attention. Understanding why parents give money to their children is 
considerably important from a public policy perspective. Under altruism, parents perfectly 
adjust their private transfers in response to a change in children's income due to a public 
provided transfers program, so that the public intervention is fully neutralized. Conversely, 
under exchange, parents are expected to give more money to a richer child, which implies a 
crowding-in effect (Cox and Jakubson, 1995). 
 
 Both in the altruism and exchange models, two key assumptions are that i) parents are 
supposed to be the dominant agent and ii) parents have a perfect information on their 
children's behavior ,however, children may have a specific bargaining power under an 
attention-money exchange if one considers a Nash equilibrium (see Cox, 1987). When both 
the child's levels of income and effort are perfectly observed by the parents, the latter will 
always choose an optimal first-best transfer. However, assuming that the parents are perfectly 
aware of the financial situation and attitude of their children seems highly questionable. There 
have been several recent attempts to introduce the tools of incentives contracting in the 
motives for private transfers (see the discussion in Laferrère and Wolff, 2003). Chami (1996, 
1998) proves that given imperfect observability, labor market conditions influence the type 
and level of transfers received from parents. When parents have imperfect information about 
the amount of effort provided by their children, Cremer and Pestieau (1996) show that 
altruistic parents have a preference for transferring resources through late bequests rather than 
inter-vivos gifts. Bequests are conditioned on the children's realized income, so that they 
provide incentives to the children into revealing their true ability . Gatti (2000), Fernandes 
(2000) and Villanueva (2001) examine the consequence of the introduction of leisure on the 
altruistic neutrality condition in an imperfect information setting. Under altruism, the parents 
face a trade-off between the insurance and the disincentives to work that the financial 
transfers provide to the children, so that the neutrality property is expected to break down. 
Both imperfect information and an endogenous child's effort may explain why parents provide 
transfers that do not respond much to both child's and parent's income. Following an exchange 
motive, Jellal and Wolff (2003) propose a model of coresidence where parents do not 
perfectly know the privacy cost of their children in home-sharing. Thus, only the children 
who live with their parents receive an information rent, and this rent is greater for recipients 
facing lower privacy costs. Finally, Feinerman and Seiler (2002) extend the services-money 
model of exchange to the case of two children and a parent who does not 
observe the children's cost of attention.  
 
 Introducing asymmetric information and effort is especially appropriate when focusing on 
child-rearing practices, which greatly influence children's outcomes. Weinberg (2001) 
develops an incentive model of the parent-child relationship and proves that parent's ability to 
mold the children's behavior through pecuniary incentives is limited at low incomes. Thus, 
poor parents are more likely to rely on non pecuniary mechanisms such as corporal 
punishment. Lin and Lai (1996) also explain why parents often argue that punishment is more 
effective than encouragement to make a child study diligently. In particular, Lin and Lai 
(1996) show that children will show less diligence if they are given monetary rewards which 
are not related to scholastic performance.   
Incentive problems within the family need not always arise. Under altruism, it is well known 
since the Rotten-Kid theorem of Becker (1974) that selfish children are expected to behave in 
their parents' best interest. However, this theorem does no longer hold when child's effort is a 
private good. Lindbeck and Nyberg (2001) argue that to promote work effort, parents may 
want to instill work norms which later cause their children to experience guilt or shame 
associated with failure to support themselves. 
 
In this paper, our aim is to examine from a theoretical perspective the impact of imperfect 
information on incentives transfers from parents to their young children. Our central question 
is to know whether private information may help to explain the pattern of private transfers and 
educational performance within families. We present a model of family contract where 
parents use appropriate incentives to cope with informational problems. We assume that a 
child can choose between two levels of effort which are imperfectly observed by the parent. 
Effort is costly, but it improves the scholar performance and then the child's future income. 
Parents provide financial incentives  to their children in order to compensated the disutility 
involved by effort. While transfers are expected to be equally divided under perfect 
information, we show that there exists a risk-sharing between the two generations under 
imperfect information. Also, richer parents are expected to face lower agency costs, which 
increases their probability to rely on pecuniary incentives.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model of 
family contract. After a description of the underlying framework, we examine the pattern of 
transfers from parents respectively under perfect and imperfect information. We also show 
that the type of family incentives depends on the parental level of income. Section 3 
concludes. 
 
2. An Incentive Model of Familial Incentives 
2.1 The basic framework 
We consider a setting with two generations, one parent labeled with up script p and one child 
labeled with up-script k. Although we restrict our presentation to the case of a single child, the 
question of transferring resources among siblings may be analyzed in this setting since there 
are different types for the child. The transfer mechanism is as follows. 
Let us consider a young child, currently in school, who has no personal income. The child has 
to choose a level of effort to achieve a given outcome, for instance a specific level of 
education, but this effort is costly. To compensate the child's for this disutility, the parent 
provides a financial transfer to the child, which depends on the type of action chosen by the 
child. An informational problem may occur in the model since the parent has not necessarily 
perfect information about the child's level of effort.  
We make several simplifying assumptions for the presentation. First, we introduce the 
problem of observability in a discrete framework since there are only two levels of effort. 
Second, we assume that the parent is motivated by a kind of paternalism. Instead of relying on 
a pure altruistic motive, we assume that the parent evaluates at the present time the future 
well-being of his child through the filter of the parent's preferences. Conversely to the 
assumption of imperfect empathy used in Bisin and Verdier (2001), this kind of paternalism 
does not mean that the parent wants to socialize his child to his own preferences. In our 
setting, it rather indicates that the child is unable to evaluate the inter temporal consequences 
of his current actions, for instance owing to limited rationality). 
In so doing, we neglect the future consequences of this effort on the child's outcomes. It may 
be argued that the child is unable to perfectly foresee the future consequences of his present 
actions. Third, as usual in the literature on incentives contracting, we suppose that the parent 
is risk neutral with respect to the transfer made to the child, while the child is risk averse. Let 
us now detail our theoretical model.  
We assume that there exist two levels of effort. A child can choose either a low level of effort 
𝑒 or a high level 𝐸, so that the inequality 𝐸 > 𝑒  holds. This effort, which can be seen as a 
personal investment to achieve a higher education for instance, is directly linked with the 
child's preferences for leisure and also with incentives from parents to work hard. Choosing 
one of these two levels of effort influences the probability that the child reaches a specific 
outcome (conditional on his performance). Let us define the probability 𝑝𝑖𝑎  of the outcome i 
given the type of child a. This outcome may be either high (ℎ) or low(𝑙), so that 𝑖 ∈  𝑙, ℎ   
and  𝑎 ∈  𝑒, 𝐸 . For each type of action 𝑎 which also defines the type of child), the different 
probabilities  𝑝𝑖𝑎   are characterized as follows : 
𝑝𝑙𝑎 + 𝑝ℎ𝑎 = 1   ∀𝑎 ∈  𝑒, 𝐸      
𝑝ℎ𝐸 > 𝑝ℎ𝑒      
𝑝𝑙𝐸 < 𝑝𝑙𝑒      
The last two inequalities indicate that action 𝐸 stochastically dominates action 𝑒. Since 
relying on the property of stochastic dominance ensures that the level of parental transfer to 
the child is an increasing function of the achieved outcome, we also assume that the child 
suffers from a greater disutility when he undertakes a higher level of effort. Let  𝜓(. ) a 
continuous, twice differentiable and convex function (𝜓′(. ) > 0, 𝜓′′(. ) > 0).  Spending more 
time to homework entails more deprivation for the child due to a lower amount of leisure, 
which implies that  𝜓(𝐸) > 𝜓(𝑒) . 
 
     We rely on a linear utility function for the parent in order to introduce the standard tools of 
incentives contracting. Thus, the parent is characterized by : 
𝑈𝑝 =   𝐶𝑖
𝑝 +  𝑊 𝑆𝑖                                                                       (1) 
Where 𝐶𝑖
𝑝   is the parent's level of private consumption.  The parent's consumption is affected 
by the type of child via the financial transfer. The second term measures the discounted gain 
of the child's performance, where 𝑆𝑖  corresponds to the child's future income or success in the 
labor market. This function 𝑊 .  ) indicates how the parent attaches himself some weight to 
the future well-being of his child. Also, we consider that the outcome 𝑆𝑖   is random to both the 
parent and the child. This allows us to neglect the issue of inter-temporal allocation and to 
focus instead on the design of current family incentives in a static framework ( An extension 
of the model is to assume that the current level of child's effort positively affects his future 
outcome. In so doing, a parent would provide more incentives and thus financial transfers for 
the type of child who chooses a higher intensity of effort). 
 
The child's utility function, denoted   by  𝑉 , is defined over both the private consumption 𝐶𝑖
𝑘    
and the level of effort 𝑎 ∈  𝑒, 𝐸 .  The child's level of satisfaction is respectively increasing 
and decreasing in these two arguments. In order to obtain explicit solutions, we rely on an 
additive utility function, separable in private consumption and effort. Let 𝑣(. ) be a twice 
continuously differentiable utility function, strictly quasi-concave, so that the child is 
characterized by some risk aversion (𝑣 ′ .  > 0, 𝑣 ′′  .  < 0)  . Then, the child's well-being 
may be expressed as : 
𝑉 =  𝑣 𝐶𝑖
𝑘   –𝜓 𝑎                                                                                                      (2) 
with 𝑖 ∈  𝑙, ℎ   and 𝑎 ∈  𝑒, 𝐸 . 
We finally turn to the budget constraints for the two generations. Let 𝑌𝑝  be the parental level 
of income, which is supposed to be exogenous. The parent devotes his income to his private 
consumption 𝐶𝑖
𝑝    and the transfer 𝑇𝑖  .This transfer depends on the child's level of effort, 
which makes the basis of the intergenerational family contract.  
Conversely, we suppose that the child has no personal income. All his resources are 
exclusively provided by the parent and they are devoted to the private consumption  𝐶𝑖
𝑘 . Such 
a situation typically occurs in families with young children, currently in school, who have to 
rely on the generosity of their parents. In that case, these transfers take the form of pocket 
money.  
The corresponding budget constraints are : 
𝐶𝑖
𝑝   =   𝑌𝑝 −  𝑇𝑖                                                                                                      (3) 
𝐶𝑖
𝑘  =  𝑇𝑖                                                                                                                   (4) 
Given the action 𝑎 ∈  𝑒, 𝐸  undertaken by the child, we seek to characterize the optimal 
familial contact that implements the higher level of effort. The aim of the parent is to secure 
the child's acceptance of the contract. This implies that the parent has to design an 
arrangement such that the child's utility is not lowered when choosing the more costly action. 
If we normalize the child's level of reservation utility to 0, the expected utility given 𝐸 has to 
be greater than the disutility involved by effort. Thus, we have : 
𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸    ≥   0                                                                  (5) 
 which is the constraint of individual rationality for the child (IR). In order to ensure that the 
child will always choose the desired type of action, the optimal contract  have also to satisfy 
an incentive compatibility constraint (IC). In the context of our model, the IC constraint is 
such that: 
  𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸  ≥  𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝑒                        (6) 
The interpretation of (6) is straightforward. The transfer scheme must be such that it is in the 
child's interest to choose the higher level of effort 𝐸 rather than the lower one 𝑒. The parent's 
problem is now to design a compensation structure that maximizes his expected utility subject 
to the child's participation and incentive compatibility constraints. 
We begin by a characterization of the first-best contract characterized by perfect information 
on the child's level of effort. Then, we turn to the case of imperfect information and show that 
the compensation structure which induces a truthful revelation leads to an intergenerational 
risk sharing. 
 
2.2 Incentives  under Perfect Information 
Let us first suppose that the parent perfectly observes the level of effort which is undertaken 
by the child. This corresponds to a setting where observation of effort is costless for the 
parent. Some explanations may be invoked. When they have young children, parents are more 
likely to monitor their children's action since the latter live at the parental home. Also, owing 
to frequent parent-teacher interactions and other peer control through neighborhood, parents 
may have many sources of information about the attitudes and behavior of their children. 
Under perfect information, the incentive compatibility constraint does not matter since the 
optimal transfer can be directly tied to the child's level of effort. Thus, the parent has only to 
account for the child's participation constraint when maximizing his expected utility. The 
corresponding maximization problem is: 
max
𝑇𝑙 ,𝑇ℎ
  𝐸(𝑈𝑝)   = 𝑝ℎ𝐸   𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇ℎ + 𝑊 𝑆ℎ  +  𝑝𝑙𝐸      𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇𝑙 + 𝑊 𝑆𝑙      
s.t   𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸    ≥   0                             (𝐼𝑅)                                  (7)                                 
 
Since helping the child is costly for the parent, it is always possible to lower the financial 
transfer made to the child and still obtain the child's participation in the contract without 
violating the IR constraint.  
This implies that the participation constraint will be binding at the optimum. Let us define the 
following   Lagrangian  ℒ1 : 
ℒ1   = 𝑝ℎ𝐸   𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇ℎ + 𝑊 𝑆ℎ  +  𝑝𝑙𝐸      𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇𝑙 + 𝑊 𝑆𝑙   
+ 𝜆 𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ + 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸      
 
where the multiplicator 𝜆  is such that 𝜆 > 0 . From the corresponding first-order conditions 
 we get : 
𝜕ℒ1
𝜕𝑇ℎ
  =  −𝑝ℎ𝐸  +  𝜆 𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣′ 𝑇ℎ   = 0                                                                      (8) 
𝜕ℒ1
𝜕𝑇𝑙
  =  −𝑝𝑙𝐸   +  𝜆 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣′ 𝑇𝑙   = 0                                                                         (9) 
𝜕ℒ1
𝜕𝜆
 = 𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸 =   0                                                         (10) 
According to (8) and (9), the marginal disutility of the transfer for the parent is equalized 
with its marginal benefit from the child's viewpoint. The condition (10) simply indicates 
that the IR constraint is binding at the equilibrium. We can now characterize the first-best 
familial contract. 
 
Proposition 1  
Under perfect information, the familial contract is such that: 
i)𝒗′𝒊)   𝒗′ 𝑻𝒉 = 𝒗′ 𝑻𝒍 = 𝒗′ 𝑻
∗  
ii) The optimal transfer 𝑻∗ satisfies    𝒗 𝑻∗ = 𝝍 𝑬  . 
Proof:  
From (8) and (9), we deduce that 𝑣′ 𝑇ℎ = 𝑣′ 𝑇𝑙 =
1
𝜆
  , so that the equality 𝑣′ 𝑇ℎ = 𝑣′ 𝑇𝑙 =
𝑣′ 𝑇∗  holds. Then, the child's marginal utilities of consumption are equalized for the two 
outcomes ℎ and 𝑙, and the transfer does not depend on i. Let 𝑇∗ be the optimal transfer. Then, 
the IR constraint can be expressed as  𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸 =   0. 
 Since we have  𝑝ℎ𝐸 + 𝑝𝑙𝐸 = 1, it follows that 𝑣′ 𝑇
∗ = 𝜓 𝐸  . At the equilibrium, the child's 
utility induced by the parental transfer perfectly compensates the cost incurred by effort. QED 
 
   Let us interpret the previous proposition. Part i) means that the child receives a fixed 
transfer in return for implementing the higher level of effort E, whatever the set of outcomes 
𝑖 ∈  𝑙, ℎ   and 𝑆 ∈  𝑆𝑙 , 𝑆ℎ . Part ii) indicates that the child's expected rent is set to zero, which 
corresponds to child's normalized level of reservation utility. 
 
Corollary 1  
Under perfect information, equal sharing is expected among siblings who undertake 
different levels of effort. 
. 
Interestingly, unequal sharing is a prediction which is common to both the altruism and 
exchange models .Indeed under altruism, poorer child should receive more money than his 
richer siblings since the parent adjusts his transfers to compensate the inequalities of resources 
between siblings. Under exchange, a parent should devote more money to the children who 
provide more upstream services. However, many empirical studies have shown that parents 
are more likely to divide equally their resources between their children. Concerning bequests, 
the basic argument is to rely on a kind of social norms such that parents suffer from a 
psychological cost when dividing their resources unequally among siblings and preserve their 
post mortem reputation (see Lundholm and Ohlsson, 2000, Wilhelm, 1996). In our setting, the 
motive for equal sharing is different since equity considerations do not intervene: equal 
division of parental resources only depends on perfect information. 
 
 
2.3 Transfers under Imperfect Information 
 We now relax the prevalent assumption of perfect information. For instance, when children  
grow older, it becomes more difficult for the parents to monitor their children's action. The 
latter are more likely to behave in an independent way, choosing alone their work effort as 
well as their relationships. This phenomena is certainly magnified when the child decides to 
live in an independent dwelling. This gives rise to an observability problem, which is more 
likely for older children and for parents who spend less time with their children. There is now 
an incentive problem emanating from the fact that the parent cannot observe the type of action 
undertaken by the child. The incentive compatibility constraint is now included into the 
parent's maximization problem, which is given by: 
 
max
𝑇𝑙 ,𝑇ℎ
  𝐸(𝑈𝑝)   = 𝑝ℎ𝐸   𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇ℎ + 𝑊 𝑆ℎ  +  𝑝𝑙𝐸      𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇𝑙 + 𝑊 𝑆𝑙      
s.t   𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸    ≥   0                                                     (𝐼𝑅)             
      𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸  ≥  𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝑒           (𝐼𝐶)     (11) 
                                                                                                                                                                
To find the optimal solutions of (11), we define the following Lagrangian ℒ2 : 
ℒ2   = 𝑝ℎ𝐸   𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇ℎ + 𝑊 𝑆ℎ  +  𝑝𝑙𝐸    𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇𝑙 + 𝑊 𝑆𝑙   
+ 𝜆 𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ + 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸     
+ 𝜇 (𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸 ) −  (𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑣 𝑇ℎ + 𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝑒 )  
 
where 𝜆 and 𝜇 are the multipliers of Lagrange associated with the 𝐼𝑅 and 𝐼𝐶 constraints 
(𝜆 > 0, and 𝜇 > 0). The first-order conditions are : 
𝜕ℒ1
𝜕𝑇ℎ
  =  −𝑝ℎ𝐸  +  𝜆 𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣′ 𝑇ℎ   + 𝜇𝑣′ 𝑇ℎ  𝑝ℎ𝐸 − 𝑝ℎ𝑒 = 0                                           (12)                                                
𝜕ℒ1
𝜕𝑇𝑙
  =  −𝑝𝑙𝐸   +  𝜆 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣′ 𝑇𝑙   + 𝜇𝑣′ 𝑇𝑙  𝑝𝑙𝐸 − 𝑝𝑙𝑒  = 0                                                (13)                                                 
𝜕ℒ1
𝜕𝜆
 = 𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸 =   0                                                                     (14) 
𝜕ℒ1
𝜕𝜇
=  (𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ + 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝐸 ) −  (𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑣 𝑇ℎ +  𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑣 𝑇𝑙   − 𝜓 𝑒 ) = 0        (15) 
Conditions to (12) and (13) can be expressed as: 
𝑣 ′(𝑇ℎ) =   
1
𝜆+𝜇 1−
𝑝ℎ𝑒
𝑝ℎ𝐸
 
                                                                                                      (16) 
𝑣 ′(𝑇𝑙) =   
1
𝜆+𝜇 1−
𝑝 𝑙𝑒
𝑝 𝑙𝐸
 
                                                                                                        (17) 
So, at the equilibrium, the child's marginal benefit from receiving the parental transfer is 
equalized with its marginal cost for the parent. However, this cost now depends on the 
distortion involved by imperfect observability, as shown by the term 𝜇. We can now 
characterize the optimal second-best familial contract 
Proposition 2  
Under imperfect Information, the optimal familial contract is such that : 
i)  𝑻𝒉
∗ >  𝑻𝒍
∗ 
ii)  𝒑𝒉𝑬𝒗 𝑻𝒉
∗  +  𝒑𝒍𝑬𝒗 𝑻𝒍
∗  = 𝝍 𝑬  
 
Proof: 
 Let 𝑇ℎ
∗ and 𝑇𝑙
∗ be the optimal transfer values. When the child's actions are not observed by the 
parents, we first need to show that both the IR and IC constraints are binding at the optimum. 
Thus, we have to prove that 𝜆 > 0, and 𝜇 > 0 . 
First, suppose that 𝜆 = 0  . We know that the multiplicator 𝜇 is non-negative. Since we have 
𝑝𝑙𝐸 < 𝑝𝑙𝑒     and assuming an interior solution, (17) holds only if the condition  𝑣
′(𝑇𝑙) ≤ 0)  is 
satisfied. However, this is in contradiction our initial assumption that the marginal utility of 
the child's consumption increases with the transfer value (v'(.)>0), so  that 𝜆 > 0. 
Second, suppose that 𝜇 = 0, meaning that the incentive compatibility constraint is 
inoperative. Using the first-order conditions (16) and (17), this implies that the transfers do 
not depend on the type of action and  𝑇ℎ
∗ =  𝑇𝑙
∗ = 𝑇∗ . Substituting the optimal transfer in the 
𝐼𝐶 constraint, we obtain : 
𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇
∗  + 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇
∗    − 𝜓 𝐸  ≥  𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑣 𝑇
∗  +  𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑣 𝑇
∗    − 𝜓 𝑒  
Since  𝑝ℎ𝐸 +  𝑝𝑙𝐸 = 1  and  (𝑝ℎ𝑒 +  𝑝𝑙𝑒 ) = 1 , we get  𝜓 𝐸 < 𝜓 𝑒 , again a contradiction. 
Then, 𝜇 > 0 and the  𝐼𝐶 constraint is binding at the optimum. 
Finally, by substracting (17) from (16) and after rearranging some terms, we obtain the 
following difference: 
1
𝑣 ′(𝑇ℎ
∗)
−
1
𝑣 ′(𝑇𝑙
∗)
=  𝜇  
𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑝𝑙𝐸
−
𝑝ℎ𝑒
𝑝ℎ𝐸
  
Since  𝜇 > 0 , 
𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑝𝑙𝐸
> 1 and  
𝑝ℎ𝑒
𝑝ℎ𝐸
< 1 , by assumption, it follows that 
1
𝑣′ (𝑇ℎ
∗)
−
1
𝑣′ (𝑇𝑙
∗)
> 0. 
 Then, we have  𝑣 ′(𝑇𝑙
∗) > 𝑣 ′(𝑇ℎ
∗)  , which implies that 𝑇ℎ
∗  is geater than 𝑇𝑙
∗ . QED 
According to proposition 2, the transfer received by the child is monotone with respect to the 
outcome 𝑖. Under imperfect observability and given the risk aversion of the child, there exists 
a risk sharing between the parents and their children. With respect to the previous literature, 
we provide a new explanation concerning the occurrence of unequal division of parental 
resources within siblings. In our setting, parents are induced to discriminate between their 
children not because they place different altruistic weights for each child, but in order to cope 
with the inobservability of actions and effort made by the children. This informational 
asymmetry influences the type of parental incentives.  
Corollary 2  
For the family , the optimal incentive transfer is higher under imperfect informational.  
Proof:  
Let  𝑇  be the optimal expected transfer when the child's effort is imperfectly observed. Then, 
we have  𝑇 =  𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑇ℎ
∗ + 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑇𝑙
∗  . We want to prove that  𝑇 =  𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑇ℎ
∗ + 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑇𝑙
∗ > 𝑇∗ ,   𝑇∗ being  
defined in proposition 1. Using parts ii) of both propositions 1 and 2, we have  : 
 𝑣 𝑇∗ = 𝜓 𝐸  (perfect information) and 𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ
∗ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙
∗  = 𝜓 𝐸  imperfect 
information). It follows that :          𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ
∗ +  𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙
∗  = 𝑣 𝑇∗ . 
Let 𝐸 .   be the expectancy operator. Since the utility function 𝑣 .   is concave (𝑣"(. ) < 0, we  
know from Jensen's inequality that  𝐸 𝑣(𝑇) < 𝑣(𝐸 𝑇 ). Then, we get : 
 𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑣 𝑇ℎ
∗ + 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑣 𝑇𝑙
∗ < 𝑣(𝐸 𝑇 )  with   𝑇 =  𝐸 𝑇 = 𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑇ℎ
∗ + 𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑇𝑙
∗. . Therefore, we  
deduce that  𝑣 𝑇∗ < 𝑣(𝑇 )   and since 𝑣 ′(. ) > 0 , the following inequality 𝑇 =  𝑝ℎ𝐸𝑇ℎ
∗ +
𝑝𝑙𝐸𝑇𝑙
∗ > 𝑇∗ holds.  QED 
 
Corollary 3  
Poor Families suffer more than rich families from agency costs thereby educational 
inequality persists. 
Proof:  
By definition, agency costs are given by the difference   𝐴 = 𝑇 − 𝑇∗ . Using Corollary 2, we 
get  𝐴 > 0. Recalling that 𝐸 𝑈𝑝 = 𝑝ℎ𝐸 𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇ℎ + 𝑊 𝑆ℎ  +  𝑝𝑙𝐸   𝑌
𝑝 − 𝑇𝑙 + 𝑊 𝑆𝑙  , the 
parental expected utility can be expressed as   𝐸 𝑈𝑝 = 𝑌𝑝 − 𝑇 + 𝐸 𝑊(𝑆) , with 𝐸 𝑊(𝑆) , 
is the  child expected desired success function for the family. . Since 𝐸 𝑈𝑝  is an increasing 
function of 𝑌𝑝 , it follows that the parental income exerts a positive impact on the possibility 
for parent to implement the second-best contract within family . QED 
 
    
    
According to Corollary 3, only parents characterized by a high level of income are able to use 
mechanism design in the form of pocket money to influence the educational attainment of 
their children. Conversely, when parents are liquidity-constrained, they cannot offer their 
children appropriate incentives, thereby leading to a lower economic position for their 
children. As a consequence, parents characterized by low levels of income have to rely on non 
pecuniary solutions to control their children's behavior. Such mechanisms are parental 
investment in the inculcation of norms of hard working (Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2001), 
monitoring by discussing with teachers, or the use of punishment and corporal violence 
(Chwe, 1990, Lin and Lai, 1996). As emphasized in Weinberg (2001), parent's ability to 
model the children's behavior is necessarily limited at low incomes, thereby increasing the 
reliance on non pecuniary mechanisms. It is likely that the set of parental incentives 
mechanisms used to control the child's behavior influences the degree of success 
Our setting provides a different explanation for the positive relationship between parental 
income and transfers to children observed both under altruism and exchange.  Implementing 
family incentives is more costly when asymmetric information matters and rent-seeking 
behaviors prevail. So, this model of family contract leads to testable predictions concerning 
the distribution of transfers among siblings, the positive effect of parental income on transfers, 
and the fact that poor parents are more constrained to offer pecuniary incentives to their 
children. Moreover, transfers decisions should be affected by parental possibility of 
observability of the children's attitude. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
 
In the growing literature on intergenerational transfers within the family, a few papers have 
recently focused on the role of information (Chami, 1998, Feinerman and Seiter, 2002, Jellal 
and Wolff, 2003). From a theoretical viewpoint, these different studies show that the pattern 
of private transfers is affected when there is asymmetric information between generations. In 
this paper, we further examine the impact of observability on family transfers and thus on 
educational performance. We draw on the theory of mechanism design and present a model of 
family contract with two levels of efforts (binary effort) for the child. While equal transfers 
among siblings are expected under perfect information, we prove that the second-best contract 
implies risk-sharing between the two generations. Poorer parents are expected to face higher 
agency costs, so that they are less likely to use financial incentives in the form of financial 
transfers. The model predicts positive correlation between familial income and child’s scholar 
performance which may imply the persistence of educational inequality. The key feature in 
our analysis is that parental information and child's effort are inter twinned. The richer parents 
are more likely to provide financial incentives to their children, while poorer parents prefer or 
resort to the use of non pecuniary incentives. 
 We have shown that relying on imperfect information within the family affects the pattern of 
intergenerational transfers. It also affects the predictions of the theoretical models of transfers 
motivated by altruism or by exchange. For instance, under altruism, the neutrality property is 
expected to break down because of the need to convey incentives to the child. As the 
magnitude of the asymmetric information correction factor may be substantial, this could 
explain why one usually observes a very low value for the difference in transfer-income 
derivatives. Again, it seems that introducing imperfect information improves our 
understanding of private transfers. A final comment concerns the variety of family incentives. 
In this paper, we have only focused on financial transfers. However, parents have different 
means to shape their children's preferences when being concerned with human capital 
investment considerations. Knowing the interplay between financial transfers and the use of 
parental non pecuniary incentives such as familial social norms or corporal punishment is an 
important question that is left for future research.  
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